Preparatory Committee for the International Conference
On Financing for Development
Third Session, second part
15-19 October 2001
Agenda Item 2
Review of the inputs to the substantive preparatory process and the International Conference on Financing for Development

Note by the Secretary-General

Technical Notes

On 8 May 2001, at the end of the first part of its Third Session, the Preparatory Committee requested the Financing for Development Coordinating Secretariat to prepare a series of “technical notes” related to issues falling under the substantive agenda for the Conference, on the understanding that such reference notes were to consist of factual, concise listing of existing proposals in a given topic, and not contain any analysis, comparisons, judgments or recommendations. The Bureau of the Preparatory Committee was entrusted with drawing up criteria for the selection of the topics and to finalize the list. At its meeting 15 June 2001, after consulting with members of the Preparatory Committee, the Bureau delivered to Coordinating Secretariat the following list:

1. Existing proposals for enhanced international cooperation on tax matters.
2. Existing proposals for international cooperation to combat corruption, including repatriation of illegally transferred funds to the countries of origin.
3. Existing proposals for innovative sources of finance.
4. Existing proposals to promote the increased and more effective participation of developing countries in the trade and financial decision-making processes.
5. Existing proposals for improved or new processes for coordinated debt restructuring (prevention and treatment of debt problems) in order to sustain growth and support economic and social development.
6. Existing proposals to increase market access to exports of developing countries.
7. Existing proposals on bilateral and multilateral investment agreements and practices towards codes of conduct on TNCs and governments with respect to FDI.
8. Existing proposals on financial crisis prevention, including operation of early warning systems and transparent and predictable international financial markets.
9. Existing proposals to ensure availability of sufficient international liquidity in order, inter alia, to avoid unnecessarily recessionary adjustment processes.
10. Existing proposals on strategies for expanding access to micro-credit and for assisting current micro-credit beneficiaries in gaining access to the formal domestic banking sector.

The corresponding technical notes have been put together by the Coordinating Secretariat in close collaboration with, and the generous assistance of, staff from various institutions and other relevant stakeholders engaged in the Financing for Development process. They are presented as individual addenda to this Note.
“Existing proposals to ensure availability of sufficient international liquidity in order, inter alia, to avoid unnecessary recessive adjustment processes.”

I. Introduction

Even with appropriate preventive policies adopted at the international and national levels, it is very probable that financial crises will continue to arise. Calls are made for the creation of adequate multilateral mechanisms to manage them, which preferably should also have a preventive function. Equally important are the domestic measures that should accompany international action.

There are essentially three ways to confront international financial crises. The first would be to create an emergency financing service, which partially replicates, on the international level, the “lender of last resort” functions of central banks. The second option is to accept that the countries affected by the crisis have to temporarily suspend

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* The preparation of this technical note was coordinated by ECLAC. Staff from the following entities collaborated, in a personal capacity, in its preparation: Other UN regional commissions, UN/DESA, IMF and UNCTAD.
their debt service and outflows of portfolio capital. An alternative to unilateral measures by crisis countries is defining orderly multilateral rules for this type of action. The two options are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the second may be necessary to ensure adequate distribution of the adjustment burdens between debtors and creditors and to avoid the “moral hazard” problems associated with emergency financing. A third way (which would also reduce moral hazard) is that of macroeconomic adjustment by the crisis country, often associated with an IMF programme. The proposals below address the three ways mentioned here

II. List of proposals

In the list that follows, the origin of the proposal and the intergovernmental body to which the proposal has been presented have been identified except in the case of Ministerial Communiques (e.g. the G-24 Ministerial Communiques are regularly presented to the IMF International Monetary and Financial Committee and the Joint IMF/World Bank Development Committee and the results of the UN Conferences are regularly presented to the General Assembly).

On international liquidity

*Revive Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).*

Presented to: Secretary General of the United Nations.

Proposal: “Consideration should also be given to reviving the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) created by the IMF in 1970. The original intent of the SDR system was to allow international reserves to be increased, in line with the need, without imposing real costs on the average country. In effect, no allocation has been made since 1981. Developing countries have had a strong need in recent years to build up reserves to reduce their vulnerability to crises, and have financed this buildup either by running current account surpluses or by borrowing on terms much more onerous than those associated with SDR’s. The result is a large flow of what is sometimes called "reverse aid". To prevent it or at least reduce it, the IMF ought to resume SDR allocations.”


Presented to: Preparatory Committee.

Proposal: “The high level event should suggest that, in view of the possibility of multiple and simultaneous financial crises, IMF, in cooperation with other relevant international institutions, undertake an assessment of the global capacity to respond to emergency needs for international liquidity, including the feasibility of temporary allocations of special drawing rights.”

Proposal: “The practice so far has been to provide assistance coordinated by IMF, to countries facing capital account problems, after the collapse of currencies, in the form of bail-outs designed to meet the demand of creditors, maintain capital account convertibility and prevent default. Such assistance has been associated with policy conditionality that went at times beyond macroeconomic adjustment. In other words, efforts have aimed at sparing hazard for international lenders and investors by putting the burden on debtors. To redress this situation, in addition to the role of IMF in providing current account financing, ensuring systemic stability also requires contingency financing to countries experiencing payment difficulties linked to the capital account. Issuing reversible special drawing rights (SDRs) for use in the provision of international liquidity should be considered. The terms under which IMF would play the role of lender of last resort should be worked out.”


Proposal: “To respond flexibly to financing needs during times of crisis, the IMF’s resources should be expanded considerably. Among the available alternatives, the most appropriate one is the temporary allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to member countries during crises. Those that do not face financing needs would keep these resources on deposit with the Fund itself in interest-bearing accounts. These temporary allocations could later be destroyed in order to avoid generating permanent liquidity.”
Another option would be to allocate the SDRs exclusively to member countries in crisis, which would repay the IMF after the crisis subsides, at which time the SDRs would be destroyed. The third possibility is for the IMF to make an allocation of SDRs to itself for use during times of crises. The latter two options would require the amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement. Of course, greater use of SDRs in the international financial system is an end in itself, which has long been advocated by developing countries.”

Proposal: “Ministers re-iterate their support for the study of a systemic emergency facility that could decisively underpin confidence in the international system when confronting extremely severe market crises. In this regard, Ministers recall proposals for the IMF to be authorized in the event of a systemic liquidity crises to provide, through the temporary creation of SDRs, additional liquidity as needed—and to withdraw it when the need has passed. Ministers reiterate their call for a study of this matter and propose its discussion at the autumn 2001 International Monetary and Financial Committee Meeting.”

Proposal: "Ministers consider that the SDR instrument should be more readily used to supplement members’ reserves at times of liquidity uncertainties. The present circumstances, in which developing countries are faced with a sharp contraction in capital flows and very high interest rate spreads, justify in our view a sizeable general SDR

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1. See different variations on the first of these proposals in United Nations (1999), Council on Foreign Relations (1999), Meltzer and others (2000), and Camdessus (2000). Regarding the latter two, see
allocation. Such a strengthening of members’ reserves would also give more confidence to members seeking a greater integration into the world economy. ”


**Presented to:** General Assembly and ECOSOC.

**Proposal:** “IMF resources should be enlarged in order to enable it to enhance the stability of the international financial system. Three channels can be considered. First, effective and swift mechanisms should be devises to increase its access to official funds in times of crises. Second, it could be granted authorization to borrow directly from financial markets under those circumstances. Third, and perhaps most importantly, SDRs could be created when several members face financial difficulties. The SDRs thus created would be destroyed as borrowings were paid. These mechanisms would facilitate the creation of additional liquidity at times of crises, without the painstaking negotiations of quota increases or arrangements to borrow. Moreover, current arrangements to borrow exhibit the shortcoming that they are activated only under systemic threat and after the approval of the suppliers of funds, with the corresponding delays in making new funds available to the Fund and the countries in distress. Indeed, the anticyclical use of SDRs to manage financial cycles should be part of a broader process aimed at enhancing their use as an appropriate international currency for a globalized world.”

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Improved IMF Facilities

Presented to: UNCTAD Trade and Development Board.
Proposal: “Given the increased instability of the external trading and financing environment of developing countries, an effective reform of the Bretton Woods institutions should seek to improve, not eliminate, counter-cyclical and emergency financing for trade and other current transactions.”

Presented to: International Monetary and Financial Committee.
Proposal: “Executive Directors agreed that less intensive monitoring arrangements than under other Fund facilities would be appropriate for members that had strong track records on policies and qualified for the CCL (Contingent Credit Line). Executive Directors also agreed that the conditions for complementing the activation review should be simplified to ensure the member using the CCL of greater automaticity in the disbursement of resources. In additions, the Board reduced the initial rate of charge to half of the surcharge under the Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF) and also reduces the commitment fees on CCL resources.”
10. **Origin:** President of the Inter-America Developing Bank.

**Presented to:** Eighty Second Meeting of the Committee of the Board of Governors.

Santiago de Chile, 18 March 2001.

**Proposal:** "Emergency assistance: the bank should provide support in emergency situations caused by financial market volatility, as has occurred during recent years. It should be noted though, that it is not the responsibility of multilateral development banks to take an active part in resolving financial crises, which should mainly be dealt with by the International Monetary Fund. However, alleviating the impact such crises have on the masses directly concerns development banks responsibilities. One of the main factors in the setback in the fight against poverty over the past few years has been the dramatic impact of recent crises on the standard of living of the working class, massive disappearance of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the resulting increase in unemployment".


**Proposal:** “Ministers note the intensive efforts currently underway for reforming IMF facilities and hope that the latest decisions of the IMF’s Executive Board—especially the elements relating to making the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) more attractive—would constitute an important improvement in the operation of the facilities. They note, in particular, that the preventive character of the CCL has been considerably strengthened by the proposed greater automaticity of its activation by countries faced with contagion. Ministers also welcome the increased incentives that the CCL could provide to eligible countries to maintain good policies. They urge the international community to support the
early eligibility of interested members. Ministers underscore the following imperatives in the future evolution of the IMF’s various facilities. First, there should be sufficient flexibility in the administration of the facilities to meet the diverse requirements of the IMF’s heterogeneous membership, given their different stages of development and the variety of shocks affecting them. In this context, Ministers propose that, should the present level of oil prices be sustained, access under the Compensatory Financing Facility and the PRGF should be more flexible. Second, changes in the facilities must not jeopardize the fundamental cooperative character of the IMF. Third, IMF financing should be complementary to borrowing from capital markets rather than a substitute, in view of the fact that structural reforms take relatively longer to formulate, implement, and bear fruit, depending on the country's degree of integration into the global economy.”


Proposal: "Ministers express serious concern about proposals for the reform of the BWIs in ways that would deprive access to either IMF or World Bank Group resources for any group of members, and especially for the poorer members whose eligibility for other sources of assistance is dependent upon the catalytic role performed by the BWIs. They regard proposals for raising the cost of access to the BWI facilities as shifting the burden of resource provision from one set of developing countries to another. In this context, Ministers have strong reservations regarding any significant shortening of maturities for IMF facilities that are provided in support of members experiencing balance of payments disequilibria of a structural character and that could not be corrected in short order. They call for further work on how the Contingent Credit Lines could be modified to improve
incentives for its use through moderating its cost, reducing the potential risk of sending negative signals to markets, and simplifying procedures on its activation. Ministers underscore the importance for the BWIs to maintain a range of instruments to address the needs of their diverse memberships.”

*Regional Monetary Funds*


**Presented to:** Preparatory Committee.

**Proposal:** “The recent financial crises in Asia and the Russian Federation have also shown that international capital movements are inherently unstable and can trigger severe financial (banking, currency, debt) crises, with attendant severe economic and social costs. In view of their strong dependence on foreign capital, developing countries and transition economies are especially vulnerable to the excessive volatility of such flows. Efforts to mitigate or prevent such financial crises should therefore be at the top of the policy agenda. This is all the more urgent because such crises reflect the impact of both policy failures and market failures.”

14. **Origin:** ECLAC Secretariat, “Growth with Stability”.

**Presented to:** Latin American and Caribbean Governments at Regional Consultation on Financing for Development, Bogota, Colombia, 9-10 November, 2000.
Proposal: Considering that financial contagion has a significant regional component, the existence of regional funds would have important advantages over an architecture with only a global fund. The first advantage lies in the possibility of changing financial agents’ expectations and behavior towards the region as a whole, thus preventing contagion. With expanded international reserves provided by other members of the fund, and perhaps also lines of credit (including contingent lines) obtained by the fund on international markets on better terms and in larger quantities than individual countries, the participating countries would have much stronger defenses against crises. As has already been noted, the fund could also play a major role in the efforts to coordinate macroeconomic policies and prudential norms.


Presented to: Preparatory Committee

Proposal: “It was generally felt that the Asia and Pacific region had great potential for increasing regional cooperation,

- Implementation of regional cooperation should be a phased process, beginning with those measures that are easiest to implement

- The measures agreed by the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers in Chiang Mai were good examples, and strong support was expressed in favor of pursuing actions in this direction.

- The use of the inter-bank swap arrangements agreed in Chiang Mai should allow for the participation of countries at different levels of openness and development in
regional arrangements. They provide the potential for deeper cooperation in this area.

- Another area for regional, cooperation involves establishing a legal a regulatory framework for international banks operating in the region.”


**Presented to:** Preparatory Committee.

**Proposal:** “The proposal for the establishment of an Asia Monetary Fund needs to be pursued; such an institution could be an important step towards the prevention and management of financial crisis.”


**Proposal:** “Deputies agreed on the need and desirability of a framework for regional cooperation to enhance the prospects for financial stability. This framework, which recognizes the central role of the IMF in the international monetary system, includes the following initiatives: (a) a mechanism for regional surveillance to complement global surveillance by the IMF; (b) enhanced economic and technical cooperation particularly in strengthening domestic financial systems and regulatory capacities; (c) measures to strengthen the IMF’s capacity to respond to financial crises; and (d) a cooperative financing arrangement that would supplement IMF resources.”
Streamlining Conditionality in Adjustment Programmes.


**Presented to:** Secretary General of the United Nations.

**Proposal:** "In the International Monetary Fund, the shift to crisis prevention, including the timely detection of external vulnerability, is yet to be completed. Another important pending issue is the streamlining of the Fund's conditionally. The Fund frequently imposes too many conditions and unrealistic demands on borrowing countries, exceeding its core mandate and taking insufficient account of domestic authorities' willingness and capacity to execute its demands. Without impairing the Fund's ability to comply with its core mandate, borrowing countries should be given the opportunity to choose their own path for reform."


**Presented to:** Spring Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee April 29, 2001, Washington D.C.

**Proposal:** "Conditionality remains indispensable for safeguarding the Fund's resources by ensuring that they are used appropriately to promote adjustment. It is also clear that structural change is indispensable for sustained growth. But countries cannot do everything overnight. Thus, there is a need to decide on priorities, focusing the Fund's conditionality on those measures that are critical to the macroeconomic objectives of country programs. The aim of streamlining should be to leave member countries scope to
make their own policy choices and thus develop the political support necessary for a sustained reform process, while tackling vigorously the main problems that have brought them to the IMF for financial support.”


**Proposal:** “Ministers note that IMF conditionality has become excessive during the last decades in both magnitude and scope, particularly in areas that lie outside the Fund’s mandate and expertise. They emphasize the need to take into account the institutional capacity and domestic legislative processes of program countries in implementing conditionality. Furthermore, excessively broad and detailed conditionality undermines the national ownership of programs, which is essential for their successful implementation, and hinders compliance with the Fund’s conditionality. The conditions applied to low-income country programs seriously strain their administrative capacity, especially when they are combined with additional conditions included in programs with the World Bank, the regional development institutions and bilateral donors. Ministers welcome the review initiated by the Managing Director of the IMF of the scope of conditionality in Fund-supported programs and the decision of the Fund Board to implement the proposed shift from broad coverage to a more selective application of conditionality. They emphasize that the objective is not to weaken, but to streamline conditionality and make it better focused, more effective, and less intrusive, as well as to enhance program ownership. Ministers stress the importance of the principle of uniformity of treatment of all countries, while taking into account the particular circumstances of each country. In addition, they underline the importance of a comprehensive revision of Fund program
design. They stress the need for technical assistance for the development of institutional capacities in these countries. Ministers note that efforts to streamline conditionality should also address the issue of how to better define the division of labor between the Fund and the World Bank, while preventing cross conditionality. Conditionality in areas outside the Fund mandate should not be included in Fund-supported programs.”

Presented to: Preparatory Committee.
Proposal: “The overriding principle of IFI assistance, including in the field of finance, must be "country ownership". Conditionality is an essential part of concessional lending, but the nature of conditionality should be reviewed in the context of prevailing domestic economic fundamentals, which will differ across countries. It was noted that conditionality is an important indicator for private investors and lenders.”

Presented to: Preparatory Committee.
Proposal: “The second theme is crisis resolution and management, through a rationalization of the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by focusing on its core functions and simplifying its facilities structure, streamlining conditionality, greater transparency in the Fund's own operation and stronger safeguards on the use of its
resources, wider involvement of stakeholders in the design of adjustment programmes and closer involvement of the private sector in crisis resolution.”

Proposal: "Ministers express concern about the intrusiveness into socio-political matters-stretching beyond the mandate of the BWIs-as reflected in the increasing tendency to extend conditionality to issues of governance and social policy. New layers of conditionality are being added with respect to private sector involvement in crisis resolution that are likely to raise the costs of access to markets, if not prevent access altogether. Ministers express their strong reservation to applying ESAF and IDA conditionality to the regular operations of the BWIs.”

On private sector related issues

Collective action clauses

Presented to: Secretary General of the United Nations.
Proposal:"In the discussions of a new financial international architecture, an important outstanding issue concerns how to prevent lenders from calling in their capital if confidence erodes. For this purpose, bonds should have collective clauses that permit a
qualified majority of bondholders to approve changes in their payment clauses. Major industrial countries should join Canada and the United Kingdom in introducing such clauses into the bonds they issue, to ease the way for the adoption of the clauses in bonds issued by emerging markets”.

Proposal: “Ministers note that some industrial countries have indicated their willingness to incorporate majority restructuring and majority enforcement provisions in bond issues in their markets, and they encourage other industrialized countries to follow this lead, while reiterating their concern about the possible adverse impact on interest rate spreads of developing countries’ bonds.”

Proposal: “In addition, as part of developing better ways to respond to crises, we call upon:

i. the private sector to facilitate "collective action clauses” for more orderly workout arrangements and we will consider the use of such clauses in our own sovereign and quasi-sovereign bond issues:

ii. the World bank in cooperation with the IMF and other multilateral development banks to work with the members to put in place effective on solvency and debtor-creditors regimes;
iii. the IMF to move ahead, under carefully designed conditions and on a case by case basis, with its recently reaffirmed policy of lending into arrears. We will instruct our Executive Director to monitor application of this policy carefully in the current environment;

iv. the private sector to build upon its experience with some emerging market countries in developing market oriented contingent financing mechanisms. The conditions of which might provide either greater payments flexibility or the assurance of new financing in the event of adverse market development. The private sector also need to be involved appropriately in crisis management and resolution.”

*Standstill, Debt Renegotiation and Arbitration.*


**Proposals:** "We welcome the progress that has been made recently to involve the private sector in the resolution of financial crises and underscore the need for further progress. We agree on the need for further efforts to implement a range of measures, in particular:

- We stress the importance of information sharing and enhancing the dialogue between countries and their private creditors, both during normal periods and when addressing emerging pressures in the external account.
- We encourage countries to establish mechanisms to support a dialogue with creditors and call on the Fund to support this process; we also agree on the
importance of collective action clauses to facilitate orderly crisis resolution. The IFIs should encourage the use of such clauses through their operations.


Proposals: "We welcome the agreement by the IMF to make further work on the framework for private sector involvement with a view to achieving greater clarity, taking into account the need for operational flexibility. In particular, further efforts are needed to:

- review the requirements and procedures used to determine access to IMF financing, including clarifying and strengthening them as necessary in order to reinforce the exceptional character of large official rescue packages. Exceptional financing, through any IMF facility, requires extensive justification. For instance, there should be evidence that the country has experienced a sudden, disruptive loss of confidence; that an early correction of difficulties is expected; and that there is a risk of contagion that could pose a wider threat to the stability of the international financial system. It should also take into account efforts by the debtor country to secure participation by private investors;

- enhance the analytical basis for the Fund’s assessment of a country’s financial position. Programmes should include thorough analysis of the country’s medium-term debt and balance of payments profile, and prospects for regaining market access. To this end, the Fund should also provide detailed information and programme assumptions about sources of private financing and reinforce the
monitoring and assessment, as appropriate, of private flows during programme implementation;

• review the experience with the Fund’s policy for lending into arrears;

• strengthen the relationship and increase coordination between the IMF and the Paris Club in the process of assessing the level and scope of participation of private creditors in debt restructuring cases, especially concerning comparability of treatment; and

• ensure that all programmes are subject to transparent ex-post monitoring and evaluation, with a view to assess the involvement of the private sector against the assumptions made in the programme.


Presented to: Preparatory Committee.

Proposal: “To face up financial crises, funds required for bailouts have been continuously increasing. In order to secure them, "involving" or "bailing in" the private sector has been contemplated. Creditors should share in bearing burdens and be made responsible for their actions. Orderly debt workouts, associated with standstill on servicing, could be considered. They may include reorganization of assets and liabilities of the debtor, including extension of maturities, and, where needed, debt equity conversion and debt write-off. Involuntary mechanisms have been resisted, but it should be emphasized that the need for mandatory provision has arisen precisely because voluntary approaches have
not worked in stemming debt runs. Fearing that mandated automatic triggers could reduce their access to financial markets, developing countries have insisted that they first be introduced in sovereign bonds of industrialized countries.”


Proposal: "Multilateral rules should be established for contending with the two basic problems of coordination that negotiations of this type entail: the possibility that some creditors (and, eventually, debtors) will resist participating in solutions (the free rider problem), and the slow pace of the process or repeated negotiations, generating high costs for debtors and creditors (“negative sum game”).

To solve the first of these problems, collective action clauses must be included in debt contracts (be they for government bonds, bonds issued by private institutions, or private bank loans) to authorize the countries where the debtors are located to defer payment (as interest accrues) for a limited period, in cases of capital flight for reasons beyond their control, or to unilaterally declare a longer moratorium if their payment capacity is clearly insufficient. These clauses should be universal, applied equally to debt contracts entered into by industrialized countries, so that markets will not penalize countries that introduce such clauses with higher interest rates or more restricted access to funds. Temporary payment suspensions could also be extended to outflows of portfolio capital. A solution to the second problem noted above might be the setting up of mutually agreed multilateral arbitration mechanisms to resolve disputes in debt renegotiation or
refinancing processes. Further, it would be appropriate to promote flexible agreements so that relatively foreseeable contingencies could be accounted for, with a view to avoiding renegotiations and explicitly encouraging creditors to continue providing resources to countries facing difficulties during critical periods. Whatever systems are devised should be applicable to all countries, regardless of their level of development.


Proposals: "We believe that encouraging the wider use of mechanism to improve communication between debtors and creditors will help to ensure that debtors countries and private creditors participate cooperatively in restructurings."


Presented to: Board of Governors of the Fund. Prague, September 26. 2000

Proposal: "There is broad agreement that the operational framework for private sector involvement should rely as much as possible on market-oriented solutions and on voluntary approaches. It is also undisputed that there may be exceptionally difficult cases that call for more concerted approaches to involve the private sector, including the possibility of standstills as a truly last resort. ...."


Proposal: “Ministers propose that the Fund deepen its studies of proposals for engaging, in a case-by-case manner, the private sector in the resolution of financial crises, including
the development at the international level of equitable procedures for debt settlement as already exist at national levels.’”

34. **Origin:** Asia and the Pacific Region Governments at Regional Consultation on Financing for Development, 2-5 August, 2000, Jakarta, Indonesia.

**Presented to:** Preparatory Committee

**Proposal:** “A number of views were expressed on the question of involving the private sector.

- Greater participation of the private sector was imperative to ensure an equitable distribution of the costs of financial crises between debtors and creditors, but there is no agreement yet on how to "bail in" private lenders
- Such measures a conditionality clauses in bond contracts, standstill and improved bankruptcy legislation are desirable but not exhaustive.
- Since most of lenders are in developed countries, a suggestion was mad that greater transparency, supervision and regulation of international lenders and investors by these countries themselves was needed.”

35. **Origin:** G-24, Ministerial Communique, 25 September 1999, Washington D.C.

**Proposal:** "Ministers recognize that the role of private capital flows will continue to expand in an increasingly integrated global economy. Therefore, it is difficult to visualize the prevention or resolution of financial crises without direct and timely private sector involvement. In this regard, the major challenge for the international community is to
develop a market-friendly strategy for involving the private sector in a manner that does not disrupt or unduly raise the cost of capital flows to developing countries. Ministers suggest that any strategy should minimize spillover effects on other borrowers. They encourage further progress toward voluntary arrangements for private sector participation before crises arise, such as through contingent credit lines, embedded call options, and debt service insurance. Other provisions are also needed to cover both crises prevention as well as resolution, including bankruptcy procedures, the establishment of creditor-debtor councils, and in extreme cases the possibility of a standstill of debt repayments. In addition, Ministers stress the importance of symmetrical disclosure of relevant information as between the private and public sectors”.

III. References


IDB Remarks by Mr. Enrique V. Iglesias, President of the Inter-American Development Bank, to the Eighty-Second Meeting of the Committee of the Board of Governors. Santiago de Chile, 18 March 2001.


______ (2000) Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs Communiqué April 15.


IMF (2000) Address by Horst Kohler. Chairman of the Executive Board and Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, to the Board of Governors of the Fund, Prague, September 26, 2000.

UNCTAD: Trade and Development Report 2001


