

ARGUING IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD: ARISTOTLE, THE ENTHYMEME, AND EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC

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The opening and closing chapters of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* starkly contrast with each other in their characterizations of rhetoric. While the first book of the treatise firmly entrenches rhetoric in the domain of logic, with nary a mention of appeals to emotion or the speaker's credibility, the third explicitly recognizes the importance of other *pisteis*, such as *pathos* and *ethos*, to a rhetorical argument (Kennedy 29; Young, Becker, and Pike 6; McAdon). I suggest that this dichotomous articulation indirectly challenges the long-standing notion that Aristotle regarded rhetoric as a tool of persuasion, and no more. On the contrary, it would seem that Aristotle's chameleonic portrayal of rhetoric—as a pragmatic tool in one instance, and as an ethical rubric and vehicle of justice in the next—hints at modern theory, which posits rhetoric as part of a wider project of communication (Lunsford and Ede 397–411). With this interpretation of the *Rhetoric* in mind, I attempt to demystify, at least partially, the more baffling and enigmatic aspects of Aristotle's treatise.

This article is chiefly concerned with the slippery definition of the enthymeme and its rightful place within the broader context of the deliberative, epideictic, and forensic rhetorics. More specifically, it will appraise the definitional divide between the syllogism and the enthymeme (Burnyeat 91; Ryan 40–61). I concede that while it remains unbridgeable, syllogisms and enthymemes exist more usefully as distinct concepts, with the former being purely epistemic and the latter serving as a uniquely rhetorical species of reasoning in the realm of the contingent. The second aspect of my thesis is that, because the enthymeme is a less philosophically rigorous tool of practical argumentation, rhetoricians must reevaluate the potentialities of epideictic rhetoric, and in particular its capacity to impart timely cultural values. In illustrating the point, this article uses the occasional addresses of two diametrically opposed orators of the post-American Civil War era: Oliver Wendell Holmes and Frederick Douglass. These two rhetoricians fundamentally disagreed on the question of depoliticizing the Civil War in the national consciousness. Their engagement in the value-laden project of forging the collective historical memory of a divisive conflict that has undergone much historical revisionism makes them ideal candidates for this article's rhetorical analysis.

Throughout the course of the article, I will measure my thesis against the Sophistic and Stoic objections to the enthymeme as a valid rhetorical tool. These objections represent, respectively, the philosophic extremes of subjective and objective truth, whereas Aristotle's enthymeme falls somewhere in between on the spectrum. For the purposes of this article, Zeno is a representative of the Stoic tradition and Gorgias is emblematic of Sophistry. To demonstrate the shortcomings of their rhetorical frameworks in a practical setting—which, incidentally, is the end to which Aristotle directs the enthymeme—I point to the curious results of their application in the forensic setting of the criminal trial.

Unpacking the Enthymeme

A recurring notion in the scholarship is that the enthymeme is synonymous with the syllogism,

or philosophic chain of reasoning (Thom 22). This definition is sorely inadequate. Indeed, the syllogism, when properly articulated, is a certainty; that is, its reasoning is foolproof and incontrovertible. The enthymeme, on the other hand, is a uniquely rhetorical tool that Aristotle enigmatically describes as “a rhetorical syllogism” (1.2.8). Aristotle appears to suggest that the dialectical bar is significantly lowered for the enthymeme. Quite apart from the syllogism, it need not be a watertight argument (Burnyeat 99). To express it crudely, the enthymeme is an argument that is “close enough” to the truth while retaining its persuasiveness. This seems disingenuous. If, as Aristotle would have us believe in the opening chapter of his treatise, rhetoric can take place on some transcendental plane of pure reason, or the “ideal state” (Sprute), why should the supposedly ideal citizens of that state settle for arguments that are probably true, as opposed to ones that are syllogistic certainties?

Let us put to one side the explanation that this is so because truth is relativistic. Not only is it a cop-out, but the rationalization is more philosophic than rhetorical. Instead, I suggest that Aristotle’s conception of the enthymeme as a cut below the syllogism hints at various rhetorical phenomena of modern resonance. These were never explicated in the *Rhetoric*, and much of what follows is deconstruction and subtext. Nevertheless, the *Rhetoric* is not a text frozen in time. If the treatise is to have continuing pertinence, we must focus less on objective determinations of what Aristotle intended to impart to rhetoricians and instead ask how Aristotle’s foundational rhetorical concepts can be appropriated and applied to modern rhetorical theory (Haskins 199; Lunsford and Ede 409–10). To this end, practitioners of rhetoric must foster polysemy rather than dismissing it as a barrier to “what Aristotle really meant.”

With this in mind, my principal point is that the enthymeme is a probability as opposed to a certainty for purely pragmatic and contextual reasons. Aristotle suggested, if only inadvertently, that any syllogism communicated by a rhetorician, even if its premises are beyond reproach, go through a rhetorical filtering process. This process encompasses, for example, the rhetorician’s nuances of speech, idiosyncrasies, and perhaps even preferred turns of phrase. In other words, every syllogism, when expressed as rhetorical argument, is colored with the rhetorician’s inimitable *pathos* and *ethos*, both of which serve to “taint” its otherwise flawless chain of logic (1.2.21). Similarly, George Kennedy (34, 44) interprets Aristotle as arguing that syllogisms are substantive arguments that cease to be wholly substantive once the rhetorician employs them in speech or writing. This is precisely the reason why Aristotle changes course so sharply in book 3, discussing form and style at considerable length (3.7–3.19). Aristotle begrudgingly appreciates that rhetoric does not take place in an “ideal state,” however adamant he may seem about this in the first book. Rather, the rhetorician is unmistakably human. As such, she cannot reel off syllogisms in perfectly detached and neutral language. This would be undesirable even if it were possible, since dry and colorless language undermines the ostensible *telos* of persuasion. Indeed, Aristotle even suggested molding enthymemes into illustrative maxims for easier consumption (3.17.17). Thus, positing the enthymeme as sound rather than indisputable reasoning is a concession to and compensation for our communicative imperfections: propensities to exaggeration and bombast, the often shaky foundations of our logical premises, the audience’s inability to follow a complex or extended argument, the time constraints our arguments must respect, and our pervading biases and predilections. Kennedy makes a similar claim, noting the “informality in . . . expression” (34) that results when a syllogism is transformed into a rhetorically deployable argument. To be blunt, the syllogism loses something in its rhetorical translation (3.12.2).

A Rejoinder to Zeno's Rejection of the Enthymeme as a Rhetorical Tool

It would be remiss of me to explain the concept of the enthymeme without placing it in the context of competing rhetorical ideas. Gorgias, a noted Sophist, would have the interlocutor believe that rhetoric is concerned solely with the manipulation of subjective interpretation, while Zeno, a practitioner of Stoicism, would profess that interpretations are mere illusions that obfuscate objective truths. The former argument simply denies the ethicality of Aristotelean rhetoric and is therefore nothing remarkable. Indeed, it is Zeno's approach that we must unpack more carefully. In his view, the judicial truism that valid conclusions are achieved by marshalling powerful arguments on both sides of the question is logically untenable (Plutarch 1034e). The argument goes like this: if the first speaker either proves her case or does not, for what reason, other than for the sake of completeness and finality, does the second speaker make her address?

Following this premise to its inevitable conclusion, the adversarial system of justice, which insists upon the adjudication of conflicting case theories, is little more than a charade. For this very reason, Zeno would look upon law courts and their stringent procedural rules with incredulity. Such scepticism is a far cry from Aristotelean rationalism. The "ideal state" described in the *Rhetoric* is one where citizens are unshakably faithful to legal and political institutions. They are therefore committed to due process and free speech, which are at odds with Zeno's logical minimalism. Yet Aristotle, to be fair, was no stranger to logic himself (Burnyeat 90). How, then, does the *Rhetoric* escape the excesses of Zeno's Stoicism while retaining its intellectual integrity?

Responding to Zeno's objection requires acute rhetorical observations that go to the heart of the enthymeme. The first observation is a mundane one, namely, that some questions have no definitive answer. It is not difficult to picture scenarios where positivistic syllogisms are woefully inadequate. The criminal trial, which is a glaring example of forensic rhetoric, is a case in point. Do all murderers willfully and brutally kill their victims, or are they to some extent at the mercy of socioeconomic circumstance? Are all those who perpetrate sexual assault callous and indifferent, or do they sometimes harbor misconceptions about their victims' consent? Does the white-collar criminal embezzle funds out of unmitigated self-interest, or have family pressures and a consumerist society unhealthily skewed her idea of material necessity? Because on these issues reasonable juries can disagree on reasonable grounds, and because equally reasonable yet contradictory conclusions can be reached, the criminal justice system (ideally) provides the defense and the prosecution with opportunities to make their cases as forcefully as possible. For what is rhetoric but a corpus of ideas; a devil's advocate that stimulates debate and has an uncanny ability to throw the proverbial spanner in the works? If the enthymeme has not forced the more extremist elements of its audience to tackle loaded questions or to at least begin the torturous process of dismantling intractable assumptions, it has necessarily failed. The natural consequence of Zeno's failure to discern subtle shades of gray in a world that is not monochromatic is a dangerous Stoicism.

The second observation that debunks Zeno's hypothetical is also trite. Many perfectly valid arguments appeal to likelihood rather than necessity, while others are based on the humbling experience that there are exceptions to every rule (Burnyeat 103). If the first speaker argues that a certain outcome is probable, the second speaker is perfectly entitled to argue that an alternative outcome is *possible*. Quite apart from Zeno's contention that any debate concludes upon hearing the first speaker's address, each speaker has a valid claim to victory in these instances of ambiguity. This is especially so when a possibility is more desirable than a probability, or the odds of opposing outcomes are, say, 51% to 49% rather than 90% to 10%.

The Enthymeme as a Means of Arguing in an Imperfect World

The foregoing analysis raises a vexing question, one that blurs the boundaries between ethical rhetoric and mere sophistry. To what extent is the rhetorician obliged to qualify her argument? How many disclaimers must the interlocutor make about the indeterminacy of her enthymeme, and how often must they be made? Prima facie, it would seem that the advocate of a possibility is not out of order if she significantly downplays the uphill nature of her battle, as long as there is some mention, however brief and carefully worded, that her proposal carries risk. Conversely, the advocate of a probability might emphasize her better and sometimes overwhelming odds of success rather than the merits of her proposal. Naturally, both approaches bode ill for a speaker's *ethos*, although they remain valid strategic decisions that we would be reluctant to deem unethical. But what of the ill-educated audience? It is at least arguable that in these instances the enthymeme encourages subordinating justice to victory. While Burnyeat (103) contends that the conscious decision to argue "*p*" rather than "probably *p*" is one of style rather than substance, he concedes that the zealous deductivist will find this unconvincing (104). Such are the realities of rhetorical practice. The "conclusions" routinely reached in political forums, courtrooms, university classrooms, newspaper editorials, academic journals, and boardrooms are little more than optimistic lunges at truth; best guesses whose reticent proponents are only too painfully aware of their own fallibility. Yet to use anything except hushed whispers to recognize these self-assured conclusions for what they are would dangerously undermine public confidence in the truth-seeking systems we use on a daily basis. The reality of wrongful convictions and political decisions that are patently wrong in hindsight might be too much for the complacent rhetorician's ego to handle. In short, Aristotle's most acute observation in the *Rhetoric* is that ethics and epistemology are not discrete disciplines. The exigencies of rhetorical truth demand a system of argumentative reasoning that is both elastic and appreciative of human error.

The portrait would not be complete without an examination of the enthymeme's more sinister and inexplicable features. As a truncated form of reasoning that relies upon omission and the power of inference, the enthymeme is apt to conceal as much as it reveals. Aristotle was not unaware of this, identifying cases where the conclusions of enthymemes are more universally accepted than their controversial premises (3.17.7). This is a telling phenomenon. It would imply that, on closer inspection, the conclusions we take for granted collapse under the weight of their own contradictions and logical inconsistencies. Funnily enough, "common wisdom" is without wisdom, except when viewed from a distance that renders the inconvenient details imperceptible. Aristotle's observation would also imply that something more serious than communicative imperfection has filtered through the enthymeme. Either a wrong premise has been inferred, or a conclusion is flagrantly inconsistent with implicit premises.

Subsequent to this bold claim, Aristotle warns against the dangerous concoction of enthymeme and *pathos*, his contention being that the latter displaces the former (3.17.8). This seems irreconcilable with the conception of the enthymeme as context-specific reasoning. The very reason that enthymemes permit the omission of certain premises is because the intuition of the addressee makes their explication redundant (Burnyeat 100). There is no reason to assume that intuition is a pragmatic process devoid of human concerns. Without straying into amateur psychology, intuition implies feeling and therefore emotion. Accordingly, the interrelationship between intuition and *pathos* seems to suggest that emotion can indeed color an enthymeme. Much like the blurriness of the ethics-epistemology distinction, invocations of *logos* and *pathos* are not distinct. In the forensic domain, for example, what appears to be black-letter legal argument often rationalizes emotional predispositions

to particular points of view. A judge who sympathizes with the homeless is more likely to lend persuasive weight to an obscure precedent that liberally interprets property rights than one who does not. Evidently, Aristotle does not, as suggested previously, imply that conclusions are solid despite their shaky premises. Rather, he merely articulates the widely held belief that we intuitively choose our conclusions before seeking out the evidence that supports them.

The Enthymeme in the Wider Context of the Deliberative, Forensic, and Epideictic Rhetorics

For the most part, however, the interpretation of the enthymeme so far delineated meshes well with Aristotle's rhetorical demarcations. For example, Aristotle makes the point that forensic rhetoric calls for reliable and concrete detail (3.12.5). Judicial proceedings demand logic and credibility in copious amounts, thus downplaying the importance of *pathos*, which, with the exception of occasions akin to the above example, is of little value in the sobering milieu of the courtroom. As such, the enthymemes of forensic rhetoric are more in sync with their corresponding syllogisms than is the case with the epideictic and deliberative rhetorics. Conversely, epideictic rhetoric might call for enthymemes that take great liberties with syllogisms, if only for the sake of commemorating the departed and depicting them in the best possible light (3.12.5). Aristotle himself observes that the brunt of epideictic rhetoric must be taken on the rhetorician's word (3.17.3). To be fair, corroborative evidence is hardly becoming of a somber and dignified memorial. The same holds true for deliberative rhetoric. The practical effect of its political, forward-looking function is that it relies more on speculation and prediction than tried and true syllogistic reasoning (1.3.4). Consider, for example, the politician who abandons reason and implores her constituency to consider the remote "chance" that a far-fetched policy might be successful.

Here we see a trend emerging. Justice and ethics have a relative and inconsistent value in each rhetorical demarcation, but the fact remains that *to some extent* they permeate all. It is at this point that we must discard the orthodox characterization of Aristotle as a glutton for persuasion. It is precisely because rhetoric is not a content-independent tool that it must draw upon other disciplines, and therefore the philosophies and ethical rubrics that underscore them (1.2.20). Accordingly, persuasion and the communication of content are not mutually exclusive realms. The persuasive rhetorician grapples with the veracity of her *idia*, or content, just as intensely as she refines techniques that amplify her *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos* (1.4–1.8). Even if she fails to persuade a particularly stubborn audience, she has at least communicated content accurately and honestly. Indeed, Aristotle makes reference to rhetoric as one of the "distinct abilities of *supplying* arguments," along with dialectic (1.2.7). Supply does not necessarily entail persuasion. The suggestion is that once the enthymeme has escaped the rhetorician's lips it is forever on the public record, irrespective of its negative reception.

In short, form and content are inextricably intertwined. While modern rhetorical theory takes this observation for granted (Haskins), the scholarship often overlooks (or ignores) the reality that Aristotle granted as much, if only implicitly. With the foregoing in mind, the more puzzling aspects of Aristotle's treatise crystallize into comprehensible elements within the whole. The enthymeme must be a watered-down version of the syllogism, owing to the peculiarities of the deliberative, epideictic, and forensic rhetorics. Argumentative reasoning must be elastic enough to move between each of these rhetorical modes with ease. It becomes apparent that only the enthymeme can guarantee as much. The syllogism is more concerned with covering all logical bases and extinguishing all traces of fallacious reasoning, however minute, than it is with rhetorical ends such as persuasion (and

the communication that subsumes it). Essentially, its adherence to rigid philosophical conventions is ill suited to pragmatic rhetorical tasks.

The Odd One Out: Epideictic Rhetoric as a Vehicle for Imparting Cultural Values

Finally, once we attribute to Aristotle an implicit recognition of the communicative dimensions of rhetoric, it becomes easier to see how the orator can apply his conception of epideictic rhetoric to ends beyond praise and blame. For one thing, Kennedy's tentative suggestion that epideictic rhetoric is also a vehicle for imparting cultural values becomes much more digestible (22). By "cultural values" I refer to the self-consciousness of a community and the way in which it delineates and understands its own historical experience. Indeed, one can hardly persuade an audience of something as abstract and idiosyncratic as this in the way that one can persuade an audience to accept the deceased's virtue, or lack thereof. The rhetorician's audience is presumably engaged in the society she speaks about, and is therefore apt to form its own conclusions about its cultural values. These conclusions derive from direct experience, and the orator cannot disabuse the audience of them with a mere rhetorical flourish. Yet this does not preclude the possibility of lucidly *communicating* to this audience a personal opinion about those cultural values.

An example will suffice. In the aftermath of the American Civil War, social commentators, ex-soldiers, and former slaves spilled much ink in hammering out an appropriate interpretation of their unique experiences. For some, epideictic rhetoric was the communicative instrument of choice. On Memorial Day, 30 May 1895, Oliver Wendell Holmes, a former Union soldier and later Supreme Court Justice, presented an occasional address entitled "The Soldier's Faith" at a meeting convened by Harvard University's graduating class. In it, he emphasized the paramountcy of the "true and adorable" faith of the soldier, Union and Confederate alike (181). His essential argument was that it was not the cause for which he fought that made the soldier admirable, but the fact that he fought *at all*. Holmes obscured any distinction between North and South based on the motives of their rank-and-file soldiers. In doing so, he peddled a depoliticized interpretation of the Civil War as a chapter of history devoid of moral content. The substance of soldier motivation, such as imperatives for liberty or the right to property, gave way to the form of their struggle—their valor, honor, heroism, and unfettered courage. Holmes argued that neither Billy Yank nor Johnny Reb had a monopoly over these generic yet all-important traits. Accordingly, any supposed ideological distinction between North and South that had the effect of hampering Reconstruction was illusory. Deeds, rather than words, were the true measure of a man.

Perusing his rhetoric, the critical observer quickly discerns Holmes's enthymeme: "The soldiers fought; therefore, we should honor them." The omitted premise, which is unsurprisingly controversial, is thus: "We should honor all those who fight, for whatever cause." By skillfully removing that incendiary premise, Holmes's speech seems rather innocuous. It is merely an ode to "the soldier's choice of honor rather than life" (181). The way is clear for Holmes to inject *pathos* into his oration, and this he does liberally. The soldier's faith is a panacea for "the vicissitudes of terror," the harbinger of "triumph in war" (182). Holmes waxes lyrical about the salutary virtues of a soldier's "blind belief" in his cause, but scarcely considers that automaton soldiers without a scruple of conviction to a just cause might commit unspeakable acts of evil that are fundamentally incompatible with honor, courage, martial heroism, and everything else that Holmes held dear. But that was not Holmes's most pressing concern. Having witnessed the carnage of war firsthand, Holmes rationalized his experiences

with reference to soldierly camaraderie rather than the lofty ideologies that seem so removed from the immediacy of the battlefield.

To Frederick Douglass, Holmes's neo-romanticism was anathema. As an African American intellectual and former slave, Douglass was more wary than most of an overeager reconciliation that conveniently bypassed the past. Vehemently opposed to the notion that the war should be emptied of its moral content, Douglass, in his Decoration Day address of May 1894, avowed his intention to "never forget the difference between those who fought for liberty and those who fought for slavery; between those who fought to save the Republic and those who fought to destroy it" (Blight 1178). In his view, that Billy Yank fought for black emancipation and Johnny Reb fought for black subjugation must weigh into any evaluation of the Civil War's historical actors.

We might articulate Douglass's enthymeme as "Confederate soldiers fought for slavery; therefore, we should abhor them." His omitted premise is thus: "We should abhor all those soldiers who do not fight for a just cause." Note how Douglass, by omitting that premise, conceals the moral universalism implicit in his argument. For what is a just cause? Arguably, Southern soldiers fought for what they perceived to be just, namely, their right to property and independence from a meddling federal government. That their cause strikes a contemporary audience as morally reprehensible does not diminish that reality.

At any rate, the argument that the North fought for black emancipation per se is wide of the mark. In this respect, we see an exemplar of how enthymemes, when used in a calculated fashion, result in partisan argument. In his Freedmen's Memorial address of April 1876, Douglass depicted Abraham Lincoln as a humble "plebeian" who metamorphosed into the "great liberator" throughout the course of the war (Blight 1164). Doubtless Douglass knew that Lincoln was only a reluctant supporter of abolitionism. That was not the point. Douglass's commitment to the "rightness" and "wrongness" of certain Civil War narratives allowed the cause of black emancipation to take on a life of its own, one divorced from historical contingency. Black freedom was not some fortuitous occurrence; rather, it was the teleological endpoint of a morally deterministic narrative. Douglass used his enthymemes not to explain history, but to rewrite history in a morally righteous fashion.

Douglass never did realize his vision. The reconciliatory impulse of America in the aftermath of war was utterly incompatible with Douglass's indignation and disdain for the Confederacy (Blight 1172). Yet even as Americans from North and South almost unanimously rejected Douglass's views, there remained an imperative to force them into the public domain by way of epideictic rhetoric. The countless functions and Memorial Day orations at which Douglass spoke with fiery zeal are a testament to this. The question lingers: why did Douglass persevere? Why, when faced with the burgeoning depoliticization of the Civil War, did Douglass feel the need to unfashionably emphasize the importance of soldiers' motives? When one factors in the capacity for epideictic rhetoric to communicate an idiosyncratic, although not necessarily persuasive, take on cultural values in a historical context, an obvious answer emerges. The futility of Douglass's argument was precisely the point. Attempting to persuade where persuasion is patently futile, yet in the rhetorician's view necessary, is the true manifestation of *ethos*.

Poring over the rhetoric of Holmes and Douglass, it also becomes apparent that Zeno's Challenge is specious. Indeed, the arguments of Holmes and Douglass, while diametrically opposed, are emblematic of the enthymeme's utility in controversial spheres of knowledge such as history. Consider the merits and demerits of the two worldviews. Douglass's morally universalistic take on the Civil War conduces to the deserved prominence of black emancipation in the national conscious-

ness. Yet it also allows sectionalism to fester unchecked and is liable to charges of historical revisionism. Conversely, Holmes's morally relativistic gloss on the war promotes reconciliation and national unity, but serves as an opening wedge for Lost Cause apologists and proponents of a Jim Crow South. Because each view has peculiar merits of its own, and because each is informed by certain value judgments, silencing Holmes or Douglass because they did not "prove" their respective cases is not only unconscionable, but also impossible. Zeno's Stoicism fails to appreciate that intensely personal experiences and convictions, distilled into argument, are not susceptible of proof to any objective standard. We must hear both sides in their entirety. Like the jury deliberating on a defendant's guilt in the foregoing analysis, history is yet another arena in which reasonable people can reach different conclusions. It is therefore a particularly apt discipline for the deployment of the enthymeme.

Conclusion

To align Aristotle with the Sophists and their single-minded pursuit of persuasion, or the Stoics and their commitment to objectivism, is to stymie the capacity of modern rhetorical theory to offer timely articulations of the enthymeme and epideictic rhetoric. In this article, I have argued that these articulations illuminate the communicative functions of the occasional address and appreciate the fine distinctions between rhetorical and syllogistic reasoning. This argument has several implications.

First and foremost, there is a fundamental disconnect between rhetorical reasoning and philosophic, or syllogistic, reasoning. In the former, latitude permits us to omit certain premises and scrupulously word others so that a persuasive argument emerges. While the enthymeme is not as logically forthright as the syllogism, it is eminently tailored to an imperfect world where absolutes and definitive propositions are not only unattainable, but also counterproductive. The rhetorician who marshals enthymemes can therefore counter any charge of unethical argument by pointing to the asymptotic nature of truth and the inherent indeterminacy of moral, economic, social, and political questions.

Finally, we have seen that this nuanced understanding of the enthymeme allows epideictic rhetoric to eschew the rudimentary functions of praise and blame. While Frederick Douglass could not sway his naysayers, he nevertheless utilized epideictic rhetoric to communicate his idiosyncratic take on the cultural heritage of the American Civil War. By immortalizing his enthymemes in the public sphere, Douglass gave them life beyond the present audience. Epideictic rhetoric, then, has an untapped potential to speak to posterity, which may be better placed to evaluate complex argument than were its forebears.

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